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The William J. Pape  II Memorial Lecture. 
Shipping and Globalisation in the Post-World War Two Era 
(with special reference to containerisation and decolonisation)1 
By Nicholas J. White, Professor of Imperial & Commonwealth History, 
 Liverpool John Moores University & Co-Director, Centre for Port & Maritime History. 
Summarising the talk by Professor White which was due to be presented to the Society on 
17 September 2020, but cancelled due to Coronavirus restrictions. 
[The video of this talk is also published on the L.N.R.S. website and available to members] 
 
With 90 per cent of the world’s commerce still carried by sea in the early-21st 
century, transnational shipping has made a key contribution to post-colonial globalisation.  
This paper focusses upon the linkages between containerisation and decolonisation – two 
world-encompassing phenomena which distinguish post-WWII globalisation from 
previous globalisation époques, and two intertwined processes that had a deep impact 
upon Liverpool.   
The origins of containerisation have been well researched and written about 
previously; most famously in Marc Levinson’s, The Box (Princeton University Press, 
2006). Levinson argued that containers offered huge cost savings, eliminating up to a 
dozen separate handlings of cargo and reducing the risks of theft and damage. 
Containerisation also got round the problem of striking dockworkers.  Moreover, says 
Levinson, the possibility that the principal American innovators (Malcolm Maclean’s Sea-
Land especially), might capture Pacific and Atlantic trade pushed European shipping lines 
into phasing out conventional vessels. The pioneering British container group from 1965 
was Overseas Containers Ltd (OCL) – a UK shipping consortium with Liverpool’s Ocean 
Steam Ship Company (also known as Blue Funnel or Alfred Holt & Co) and London’s 
P&O as the lead instigators and partners.  For OCL’s Australian service after 1968, a BBC 
journalist discovered that ‘nine ships will replace the forty which used to exist… and each 
ship can make five round trips a year… instead of two-and-a-half’.2  
But Levinson’s interpretation of containerisation focuses on the ‘Anglo-sphere’. 
Technological change is blamed on the obstructiveness of British, American and 
Australian dockworkers (as well as the stimulus provided by US logistical demands in the 
Vietnam War). This neglects the wider-world situation; the process of decolonisation and 
the ways in which non-European institutions and peoples contributed to the development 
of new shipping forms.  
The breakup of the European colonial empires after 1945 was not just about global 
political change it also involved significant world-wide economic and social shifts. In 
shipping, for example, this would mean the rise of national shipping lines in developing 
countries – a wider economic and social devolution, therefore, beyond the formal transfer 
 
1 This is a modified version of my chapter in Niels Petersson, Stig Tenold and Nicholas J. White 
(eds), Shipping and Globalisation in the Post-War Era: Contexts, Companies, Connections (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019) available Open Access at: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030260019.  




of political power.  Containerisation in my view was reflective of postcolonial 
globalisation, in tandem with economic decolonisation.  
In the formation of OCL there is plenty of evidence to support the Levinson view 
– the competitive threat from Sea-Land, for example, was taken very seriously; the 
consortia concept reflected the huge capital costs involved in building and running an 
efficient container fleet; and, from the early-1950s, the Blue Funnel board in Liverpool 
were highly exercised by the costs incurred by strikes, go-slows and outmoded port 
facilities in both Australia and the UK.   
However, technological diversification was also a strategy to reduce sovereign risk 
in the postcolonial world. British shipowners believed that, under pressures from national 
shipping lines and the holding down of freight rates by independent states, the returns on 
capital from conventional liners were limited.  
Decolonisation and Competitive Pressures 
By the 1960s, British companies were sharing the Indian and Pakistani trades with 
the national lines with the former demoted to ‘the rank of junior vice-admiral’ (in the 
words of a British shipping executive).3 The claustrophobia of post-colonial shipping 
markets was epitomised by developments in the wake of the separation of Singapore from 
Malaysia in 1965 and the emergence after 1968 of the Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation (MISC) and Singapore’s Neptune Orient Line (NOL). The plan of British 
ship-owners – Blue Funnel, P&O and Ben Line - to form their own Malayan-registered 
subsidiary was scuppered.  
National lines were usually contained within existing conferences. Nonetheless, 
they were difficult partners. For example, in Ghana by 1964, the Black Star Line (BSL), 
advised by the Israeli Zim Line (to the chagrin of Elder Dempster,) was believed to be 
‘overcarrying’ and not engaging in ‘true sharing’ in the Baltic trade.4  
Indeed, conferences were increasingly suspect as ‘neo-colonial’ cartels. Pressures 
from developing countries culminated in an enquiry into conferences and rates by the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Decolonised states could also turn to 
the Soviet bloc whose ‘substantial national fleets of merchant-cum-military sealift 
ships…were under no obligation to show a profit and could therefore undercut [conference 
rates]’.5  
With the benefit of hindsight, developing-world shipping proved ineffectual. 
UNCTAD’s 40:40:20 Liner Code only came into operation from 1983 and US non-
ratification, and European governments applying the code selectively, undermined its 
universality. China boasted the world’s 9th largest merchant fleet by 1986 but a CIA 
 
3 Turner, Business, p. 307.  
4 Merseyside Maritime Museum (hereafter MMM), OA/2078/1, Cotton, Liverpool to Lucas, Accra, 
27 September 1962.  
5 Woodman, R. (2010) Fiddler’s Green: The Great Squandering: 1921-2010 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: 
History Press, 2010), p. 339. 
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analysis concluded that China still did not ‘pose a competitive threat’  since ‘most of 
China’s vessels are old and inefficient and its service is unreliable’.6  
Yet, fear of the possible rather than the actual drove decision-making. Highly 
apprehensive about the prospect of maritime nationalism, containerisation by British 
shipping companies was part of a wider picture of increased cooperation and combination. 
This defensive strategy was driven home by Frank Lane, Elder Dempster’s chairman, in 
justifying his company’s full absorption into the Ocean Group in August 1965: ‘[T]he 
financial results of shipping…will… depend more and more on specialisation and the use 
of modern techniques…The greatest benefits…will accrue to those organisations which 
are large enough to be able to justify the expenditure…which the far reaching 
changes…entail’.7 This clearly meant containerisation. The essence of OCL was a 
combination of four leading British shipping companies (Blue Funnel, P&O, Furness 
Withy and British & Commonwealth) searching out new means to defend market shares 
and reduce political risk.  
Decolonisation, Political Risk and Containerisation 
The sense of vulnerability was exacerbated by additional costs and inconveniences 
associated with changing conditions in the decolonising world. Disputes between 
maritime labour and capital, and 
rising labour costs, were certainly not 
unique to post-war Liverpool, New 
York or Sydney. In 1956, Sir John 
Hobhouse, Holts’ chief executive, 
reported that throughout Asia trade 
unions believed they were ‘not up to 
the best Western standards unless 
[they] organise[d] frequent 
stoppages’.8  
There was also trouble at sea 
against the backdrop of decolonization.  A strike led by Nigerian stewards on the Elder 
Dempster mail boat Apapa while berthed in Liverpool in the summer of 1959 resulted in 
a commission of enquiry in Lagos, identifying inequalities in pay and perks between 
European and African crews. Elders was advised to end the loosely-regulated system of 
work hours, and institute overtime payments.9  
Port labour forces were also caught up in the competing nationalisms which 
characterised late- and post-colonial politics. Hobhouse noted in 1956 that Sinhalese-
 
6 CIA Online Reading Room, EA-M 86-20126, ‘China’s Merchant Marine Expansion: The Impact on 
International Shipping’, 14 October 1986, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t01017r000606440001-0.  
7 MMM, OA/1696, ‘Acquisition’, memorandum for senior staff, 13 Aug 1965. 
8 MMM, OA/692/2, ‘South East Asia in 1956’, Blue Funnel and Glen Lines Staff Bulletin (July 1956), 
pp. 171-2. 
9 L. Schler, Nation on Board: Becoming Nigerian at Sea (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), pp. 92-3.  
Loading a break-bulk ship, Courtesy Shaping San Francisco 
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Tamil rivalries in Ceylon had ‘disorganised the labour force at Colombo so that the port 
is in a constant state of congestion’.10  
Congestion intersected with labour unrest. The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ 
Association conducted surveys of its members in the 1950s on the ‘wastage of carrying 
power’ arising from slow turnaround. UK and Australian ports were deemed outmoded 
but so was maritime infrastructure in South Asia, the Caribbean, and East and West Africa. 
Delays also reflected restrictive labour practices, go slows and strikes.11 In a 26-week 
round voyage to India by a Brocklebank freighter in 1957 only 28% of the total time was 
‘spent on actual passage at sea’.12   
Political upheaval interlocked with port congestion. Blue Funnel experienced 
‘difficult and disappointing’ trade with China at the end of 1968 due to the ‘political 
tensions’ of the anti-western Cultural Revolution and the ‘impossibility of maintaining 
liner schedules through chronically congested ports’.13  
Theft was not unique to ports in the Global North either. John Goble, a former Chief 
Officer with Elder Dempster, emphasised that:  
Security of the cargo was a constant preoccupation… as the countries of West 
Africa succumbed to civil disorder [crime] grew to become both organised and 
routinely violent. The ship itself later became the focus of criminal attention… 
[A]nything of value not immediately required was kept under lock and key.14  
Violent, large-scale pilferage was an Asian phenomenon too. In the midst of 
Indonesia’s Confrontation with British-backed Malaysia, there was an extreme incident of 
pillage at the port of Balikpapan in Kalimantan in March 1965. 30-40 police and army 
personnel, plus dockworkers, ransacked the cargo of Lycaon, a steamship owned by the 
NSMO (Blue Funnel’s Dutch subsidiary). The loss of passenger property alone was valued 
at £8,000 (equivalent to £143,000 at current prices).15   
The Balikpapan incident also underscored how information networks unravelled 
through economic decolonisation.  Expatriate merchant firms, which scouted out and 
booked cargoes, were prime targets of indigenisation measures. Blue Funnel’s Dutch 
agents in Indonesia had been nationalised after 1957, and British ones taken over in the 
mid-1960s. By the late-1950s in China, Blue Funnel had no means of ‘knowing how we 
get what cargo we do’. Cargo flows could be ‘turned off at will for political reasons’.16 
Despite Beijing’s economic liberalisation from the late-1970s, as late as 1986, the CIA 
 
10 ‘South East Asia in 1956’. 
11 MMM, LSSOA/D/SS/2/7, Annual reports for 1950, 1952 and 1955.  
12 J. Pottinger, ‘To Calcutta in the 1950s’, Bulletin of the Liverpool Nautical Research Society, 58, 4 
(March 2015), pp. 37-40.   
13 MMM, OA/4031, Annual Report & Accounts 1968. 
14 J. Goble, ‘Liverpool and West Africa: twilight of an individual trade’, Bulletin of the Liverpool 
Nautical Research Society, 60, 4 (March 2017), p. 4.  
15 MMM, OA/1869/1, Djakarta File. Jan, Feb, Mar 1965, Boerstra to Amsterdam, 10 March 1965 
enclosing ‘Visit to the Musi, 4-7 March 1965’; Boerstra to Amsterdam, 12 March 1965; notes on 
discussion in Amsterdam, 5-6 March 1965.   
16 MMM, OA/JLA/22/1, Note by Alexander, 10 October 1958. 
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reported that ‘China’s refusal to 
allow foreign shipping agents to 
establish offices in Beijing makes it 
difficult to compete for Chinese 
business’.17  
Investing in containerisation 
provided an opportunity for Holts to 
focus on the lower risk trades of 
Australasia. OCL’s first 
containerised service was UK-
Australia followed by Europe-East 
Asia 1972-3 where, as Nicholas 
Barber, a key strategist at Ocean 
and later group chairman, has 
pointed out, the principal attraction 
was the high value manufactures of 
Japan and Hong Kong, not the old ‘colonial’ primary products of Southeast Asia.18  
Non-European Agency in Containerisation 
The lure of Australia, however, also needs to be set within the wider context of the 
decolonisation of the former ‘White’ Dominions. As Ocean’s chairman, Sir Lindsay 
Alexander reflected, the Canberra government ‘realise[d] that cargo handling costs in 
Australia were very high’ and the ‘the consequential rates of freight would…hamper 
Australian overseas trade’. The Australians insisted that the Europe-Australia services be 
rationalised. Canberra also 
wished to ‘cut out the 
recalcitrant Australian 
docker’. If the British lines 
would not containerise, the 
Australians ‘would try to 
find somebody else’.19  
Containerisation, 
then, was an attempt to 
prevent further dissipation of 
established Commonwealth 
(including South African) 
trade links, threatened by the 
assertive and reorienting ex-Dominions. OCL was a grand, post-imperial vision in intra-
Commonwealth trade (which, in Asia, would encompass Singapore and Hong Kong). 
OCL was about having the best of both worlds – Commonwealth and EEC - since 
 
17 CIA, ‘China’s Merchant Marine’, p. 11. 
18 Email communication, 18 February 2013. 
19 MMM, OA/750, ‘Liner Shipping at the Crossroads. Part V – OCL and all that’, c. 1971. 
Partially populated after deck of the ‘Triple E’ Majestic 
Maersk (2013).         Picture courtesy Wikimedia 
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Southampton rather than Liverpool as the start and end point allowed transhipment at 
northern European ports. 
Equally, however, British shipowners wished to secure a slice of burgeoning intra-
Pacific exchanges. OCL also participated in the containerisation of the Australia-Japan 
trade after 1968. This was also a response to Australian maritime protectionism and the 
ambitions of the Australian National Line (ANL).20  And, in the original OCL project, 
Ocean’s Chairman, Sir John Nicholson, informed his opposite number at P&O in 
December 1965 that it was not only Sea-Land and the Swedish Wallenius Lines but also 
ANL which would capture business should the British companies not ‘establish an 
effective organisation’.21  
Yet, the initiative of ex-British colonies in the take-up of containers needs to also 
encompass the non-Dominions. The ‘tiger economies’ of Singapore and Malaysia were 
the exemplars where container port development was embraced by pragmatic 
governments to support their nationalistic economic modernisation agendas. By the 1990s, 
Singapore was the world’s largest container port.  
Conclusion: Contextualizing Containerisation 
On the surface, the adoption of containerisation by European shipping companies 
represented the usual business imperatives of cutting costs and meeting competition. 
Nevertheless, the variables had been greatly influenced by the deeper post-war global 
phenomenon of decolonisation. New national shipping lines, political and economic 
instability and imponderability, labour troubles, port inefficiency and pilferage, which 
accompanied decolonisation and pushed up shipping costs, should be factored into the 
containerisation equation as well.  
And, for all the talk of a ‘container revolution’ containerisation was not that 
revolutionary. The strategic lead taken by British shipping companies post-1965 was 
primarily to save core business. Britain’s second box business, Associated Container 
Transportation, also began its operations in Australia where three of the major partners, 
Cunard, Blue Star and Ellermans, sought to defend their interests. Containerisation was in 
large part concerned with preserving Commonwealth links threatened by post-colonial 
globalisation. Equally, the ex-Dominions wanted to use the box to diversify their trade 
links but also to reduce costs. The agency of Asian members of the Commonwealth should 
not be overlooked either. Decolonisation and containerisation went hand-in-hand in the 
mercurial mix of nationalising and internationalising tendencies that characterised the 
transition to post-colonial globalisation. As the late, great Peter Davies observed for West 
Africa: the ‘prime factor’ distinguishing the post-1945 era was ‘political and then 
economic independence’ but decolonisation was ‘closely allied to the greatly accelerated 
pace of technological progress’.22   
 
 
20 Chih-lung Lin, ‘Containerization in Australia: The formation of the Australia-Japan Line’, 
International Journal of Maritime History, 27, 1 (2015), pp. 124-8.   
21 MMM, OA/JLA/20/1, Letter to Sir John Anderson, 13 December 1965. 
22 P. N. Davies,  The Trade Makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972, 1973-1989, 2nd edition 
(St. John’s, Newfoundland: International Maritime History Association, 2000), p. 297.   
